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The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred 
man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed… 
—Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8 
 
Writing in 1983 about state violence in contemporary Nigeria, Wole 
Soyinka relates the story of a medical doctor, Seinde Arigbede, who 
had been kidnapped by a special wing of the state police and subjected 
to the terror of imprisonment and torture. “The circumstances,” 
Soyinka suggests, “would have amazed even Franz Kafka” (Man Died 
vii). The reference point creates an intriguing moment of 
intertextuality that connects the narrative of brutality in a troubled 
postcolonial Nigeria with a central expression of the horrors of 
European industro-capitalist modernity. The terrors experienced by 
Arigbede—“taken to an empty cell, where he was hung up by the 
wrists and left dangling, his feet away from the ground, from specially 
fixed ceiling hooks” (Man Died vii)—are here implicitly aligned with 
the metaphysical traumas that accompany Joseph K in The Trial as he 
is processed by a legal system that refuses to reveal his putative crime. 
In Soyinka’s rendering of it, the postcolonial space seems unable to 
escape the uncanny return of those most traumatic elements of colonial 
power systems, or is at least haunted by the possibilities of such 
repressed, and repressive, links. It is of note, then, that the allusion 
should come in the course of a new Preface for Soyinka’s prison notes, 
The Man Died, at the outset of which he insists on the obligation to 
witness the deprivation of humanity upon which certain forms of the 
Law rely: 
 
I testify to the strange, sinister by-ways of the mind in solitary confinement, to 
the strange monsters it begets. It is certain that all captors and gaolers know it; 
that they create such conditions specially for those whose minds they fear. Then, 
confidently, they await the rupture. It is necessary to keep in mind always that we 
know only of those who have survived the inhuman passage. (12) 
 
Here Soyinka makes clear that the problem of the Law and the 
violence done to subject-bodies under its control is not simply one of 
profane praxis; understanding the proper source of its power requires 
us to look more closely at the radical othering that lies at the very heart 
of the Law’s metaphysical origins. Moreover, within the postcolonial 
space, Soyinka’s memory of prison suggests, the othering at the centre 
of the juridical order is haunted by colonial Law and the very specific 
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forms of violent othering that sustained it (and European modernity 
more generally).  
 
 
A Body that Matters: Death, Ritual, and the Law in Death and 
the King’s Horseman  
 
In terms of his work for the theatre, Soyinka’s interest in the 
metaphysics of Law is most openly played out in his masterly work 
Death and the King’s Horseman (1975), a play written just a few years 
after his release from a Nigerian prison and while in exile in England. 
The contexts informing its gestation shaped a play closely concerned 
with the functioning of different systems of Law (European and 
indigenous) and the philosophical underpinnings driving their 
performative praxis. At the play’s heart we find a moment of contact 
between European legality and the older systems of law and justice it 
sought to supplant; the play in effect becomes about the metaphysical 
traumas that such a process instigates. In this regard the shadow of 
postcolonial Nigeria retroactively haunts the action on stage that 
concerns itself with the methodologies of colonial intervention. It is a 
piece structured by a series of passages (to borrow Soyinka’s image) 
—gateways, doorways, punitive spaces, transitional spaces between 
life and death—that mark occasions of purchase and/or slippage for 
radically different conceptions of the Law and its power over subject 
bodies. At its core stands the metaphysical relations between the Law, 
ritual, knowledge, and power—and the role played by this relational 
nexus in the production of the meanings attached to certain bodies and 
their deaths. Indeed what is revealed by, and is at stake in, the conflict 
staged by the play is something akin to Jean-François Lyotard’s 
differend, a concept that Gayatri Spivak usefully parses as “the 
inaccessibility of, or untranslatability from, one mode of discourse in a 
dispute to another” (96). Read in these terms the play becomes about 
the spaces of un-readability and difference produced when two 
renderings of the Law face each other.  
Death and the King’s Horseman tells the story of Elesin, chief of 
the King’s stables, who lives a most privileged life amongst his 
Yoruba tribe in return for his future role in a key tribal tradition—
when the King dies it is his duty to sacrifice himself and to follow him 
to the realm of the dead. This is the Law as ritual, tradition, and sacred 
duty. As one character (Joseph, a local man now working as a servant 
in the local colonial administrator’s household) explains it: “It is native 
Law and custom. The King die last month. Tonight is his burial. But 
before they can bury him, the Elesin must die so as to accompany him 
to heaven” (167). This duty is seen as fundamental to the continuing 
well-being of the tribe—it is in this sense a ritual function of the Law, 
a purification that ensures communal cohesion. It is also a duty that is 
located within the fabric of a particular communal understanding of 
time and space, and of the body as a site of interconnection between 
metaphysical abstraction and corporeal reality. In the first scene, for 
example, we meet Elesin on the day of his appointed (self-willed) 
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death and it is clear that he reads the proper meaning for his upcoming 
actions in the context of an extra-profane relationship with the 
community that has sustained him in his privileged life. Walking 
through the women of the market place (the central space of communal 
self-expression) he proclaims: “This market is my roost. When I come 
among the women I am a chicken with a hundred mothers. I become a 
monarch whose palace is built with tenderness and beauty” (148). It is 
in this metaphysical rendering of the community that Elesin locates the 
source of his power (“I become a monarch”), and the importance of his 
duties. Indeed the transcendental nature of these duties is quickly 
reinforced through an exchange between Elesin and a powerful 
representative of the tribe (the female Praise-Singer). It is an exchange 
designed to remind Elesin to remain focused on the task that lies 
before him and the perils of not doing so: 
 
PRAISE-SINGER. There is only one home to the life of a river-mussel; there is 
only one home to the life of a tortoise; there is only one shell to the soul of man; 
there is only one world to the spirit of our race. If that world leaves its course and 
smashes on boulders of the great void, whose world will give us shelter? 
 
ELESIN. It did not in the time of my forebears, it shall not in mine. (149) 
 
Crucially, Elesin’s body is here rendered as a shell for a soul that is 
part of a larger continuum of spirits—his profane body is thus a 
signifier of a transcendental tribal history. As we will see this concept 
of Elesin’s corporeality is key to the play’s rejection of European 
norms of jurisprudence.  
In this regard we should note the extraordinary care and attention 
that is paid to Elesin’s body throughout these opening moments of the 
play. Time and again we see the ways in which Elesin’s body is seen 
as the site of a communal safeguard; thus Elesin can demand that 
almost any of his desires be met. As in the moment, for example, when 
he tells the women of the market-place to clothe him in the best finery 
they can muster—a demand that is answered instantly by Iyaloja (the 
“mother” of the market):  
 
Richly, richly, robe him richly 
The cloth of honour is alari 
Sanyan is the band of friendship 
Boa-skin makes slippers of esteem. (156) 
 
In all of this Soyinka demonstrates the ways in which the community 
sees Elesin’s duty to accompany the King on his journey through the 
realm of death as an essential ritual, one that ensures the continuing 
balance of a world divided into the realms of the living, the unborn, 
and the dead—all of which are kept in their proper relation by the 
fourth stage of transition, of which Elesin’s duty is a key part (see 
discussion of “The Fourth Stage” below).  
Fatally, however, Elesin is distracted from his duties by the fruits 
of his favoured life—just as the Praise-Singer feared he might be. 
Confronted with his imminent death, Elesin succumbs to the desires of 
the life-instinct and decides to to take a new young bride—thus 
delaying the act that will allow him to follow his King away from the 
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world of the living. His decision is clearly imbued with the hope of 
conceiving a child before he dies: 
 
ELESIN. Who does not seek to be remembered? 
Memory is Master of Death, the chink 
In his armour of conceit. I shall leave 
That which makes my going the sheerest 
Dream of an afternoon. Should voyagers 
Not travel light? Let the considerate traveler 
Shed, of his excessive load, all  
That may benefit the living. (159) 
 
The hesitation proves disastrous as it allows the local colonial officer 
(Simon Pilkings) to intervene in what he sees as a barbaric primitive 
ritual; as he puts it: “You think you’ve stamped it all out but it’s 
always lurking under the surface somewhere” (166). In this image of 
barely repressed fear we see the ways in which the colonized body is 
articulated in terms of an incommensurate mimicry: “torn between 
exclusion as something radically different to the West and the demand 
to join and become the same as it” (Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 2). 
From this moment onwards Elesin’s body becomes a contested site, 
the locus of the slippages implicit in Lyotard’s notion of the differend. 
In a crucial moment of miscommunication, for example, we observe as 
Pilkings learns of Elesin’s fate from a report submitted by a local man 
(Amusa) who has converted to Christianity and joined the local 
colonial police service. Pilkings reads the report out to his wife Jane:   
 
PILKINGS. Amusa’s report. Listen. “I have to report that it come to my 
information that one prominent chief, namely, the Elesin Oba, is to commit death 
tonight as a result of native custom. Because this is criminal offence I await 
further instruction at charge office. Sergeant Amusa.”  
 
JANE. Did I hear you say commit death? 
 
PILKINGS. Obviously he means murder. (165-166) 
 
The way in which Pilkings’s European viewpoint automatically 
mistranslates the nature of this event—transforming ritual sacrifice 
into the legalistic terminology of “murder”—is vital to the play’s 
metaphysical investigation. Indeed this mismatch of an imported 
terminology attempting, and failing, to grasp the proper significance of 
events is confirmed when Jane makes the point that her husband surely 
cannot arrest Elesin “simply on the er … what is the legal word again? 
—uncorroborated word of a sergeant” (166). Later in the play the need 
for effective and reliable surveillance to sustain European power is 
confirmed when the local senior colonial administrator tells Pilkings: 
“Nose to the ground Pilkings, nose to the ground. If we let all these 
little things slip past us where would the empire be eh? Tell me that. 
Where would we all be?” (188). By this time Pilkings has already 
arrested and imprisoned Elesin before he could complete his ritual 
duty—the ostensible motivation here is to protect Elesin from himself. 
That the figure of colonial legitimacy clearly reads his actions as 
saving “the native” from his superstitious (pre-modern) barbarity links 
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Soyinka’s play with the ideological grammar of corporeality (and, 
finally, death) traced out by Gayatri Spivak’s deconstruction of the 
banning of suttee in nineteenth-century colonial India. Her formulation 
that this legal intervention was based on the sense that “White men 
[were] saving brown women from brown men” (92) certainly captures 
a form of power-dynamic that speaks to the action of Death and the 
King’s Horseman. Elesin’s hesitation, in this regard, betrays the faith 
of the market-place women who earlier assured the local policeman 
Amusa that “Tonight our husband and father will prove himself greater 
than the laws of strangers” (175). Moreover, Elesin is all too aware of 
the damage done by his failure to complete the ritual—telling a self-
satisfied Pilkings: “You did not save my life, District Officer. You 
destroyed it” (204).   
In the end it is Elesin’s son Olunde (returned from England where 
he is studying medicine) who completes the ritual in his father’s place, 
sacrificing “himself in his stead to try to ensure the continued spiritual 
wellbeing of his community” (Crow and Banfield 81). In these final 
moments of the play Elesin, after witnessing his son’s sacrifice while 
“languishing in a colonial jail,” kills himself using his prison chains 
(Amkpa 29). As Awam Amkpa parses it:  
 
The place and manner of his self-execution, thus, occurs outside the prescriptions 
of the community’s codes of ritual. By the play’s end, the tragic protagonist 
cursed with an identity drained of all communal significance, rids the world of his 
presence by strangling himself with his chains in his prison cell—a cavernous 
metaphor for colonial subjugation. (29)  
 
This makeshift prison cell’s potential as “cavernous metaphor for 
colonial subjugation” is only deepened by the revelation that this cellar 
was once (as Pilkings puts it) “where the slaves were stored before 
being taken down to the coast,” and that is it is now used “as a 
storeroom for broken furniture” (Horseman 200). This room thus 
operates as a multivalent space of repression within the local colonial 
apparatus—as Craig W. McLuckie puts it: “What has been implicit 
throughout the play is now explicit—the bare power structure of the 
white colony” (157). Elesin’s body is stripped of its proper 
signification in a space filled with the material detritus of colonial 
presence and practice; his body is also revealed as a kind of palimpsest 
as Pilkings’s intervention in the name of the (European) Law is 
implicitly encoded as the latest in a series of corporeal strategies born 
out of the imperial will to power. This seemingly incidental revelation 
adds force to Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s assertion that “colonialism and the 
forces it generated have always been part of capitalist modernity” (in 
Amkpa xi); Elesin’s position within the official discursive fabric of 
empire is located in a clear line of descent from another version of the 
“native body” as product. Which is not to suggest a simplistic binary 
opposition—as Amkpa notes, Death and the King’s Horseman 
“presents dramatic conflict as multilayered and complex rather than a 
Manichean contest between well-defined heroes and villains” (29). 
This complexity operates through every facet of the piece. Throughout 
the play it is made clear that Elesin’s actions must be read not in 
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isolation but in terms of a complete set of cultural codifications. In 
particular, the signification of “death” in the proposed actions of Elesin 
is presented as largely incommensurate to its operative function within 
the Eurocentric imperial imagination. It is this dynamic that produces a 
particular kind of imaginative tension throughout the piece. The 
multivalent articulation of death as a cultural signifier with different 
performative functions within the European and Yoruba worldview 
traces the tensions connected with the implementation of imperial 
conceptions of the Law. At stake here is the production of, and 
resistance to, a juridical order as ideological bellwether for capitalist 
modernity. It is this tension that haunts the Praise-Singer’s final words 
to Elesin (moments before he takes his own life): 
 
Elesin, we placed the reins of the world in your hands yet you watched it plunge 
over the edge of the bitter precipice. You sat with folded arms while evil 
strangers tilted the world from its course and crashed it beyond the edge of 
emptiness—you muttered, there is little one man can do, you left us floundering 
in a blind future. Your heir has taken the burden on himself. What the end will 
be, we are not gods to tell. But this young shoot has poured its sap into the parent 
stalk, and we know this is not the way of life. Our world is tumbling in the void 
of strangers, Elesin. (218) 
 
The play’s ending is thus extraordinarily complex and ambiguous, on 
the one hand the community has seen the ritual completed at last, but it 
is clear that a fatal imbalance has been introduced to the world of the 
Yoruba. The laws of life and death, and the power to define the correct 
relationship between the two stages, have been usurped and disrupted. 
 
 
The Fourth Stage: Law as Metaphysics 
 
In his essay “The Fourth Stage” Soyinka unpacks the underlying 
intellectual fabric of this issue further, revealing the ways in which the 
life/death cycle is imagined differently within the Yoruba and 
European worldviews (the European ordering of “time” is here 
obviously shadowed by the rise of capitalism as an organising 
principle):   
 
The Yoruba is not, like European man, concerned with the purely conceptual 
aspects of time; they are too concretely realised in his own life, religion, 
sensitivity, to be mere tags for explaining the metaphysical order of his world. If 
we may put the same thing in fleshed-out cognitions, life, present life, contains 
within it manifestations of the ancestral, the living and the unborn. All are vitally 
within the intimations and affectiveness of life, beyond mere abstract 
conceptualization. (144) 
 
For the Yoruba, then, “the past is the ancestors,” the present belongs to 
the living, and the future to the unborn—but in addition there is a 
“fourth stage” that Soyinka terms the “gulf of transition” (148):  
 
This is the fourth stage, the vortex of archetypes and home of the tragic spirit. 
It is necessary to recall again that the past is not a mystery and that although the 
future (the unborn) is yet unknown, it is not a mystery to the Yoruba but co-
existent in present consciousness. (149) 
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There are clear links here with the division between profane and sacred 
time (linear in the former, cyclical in the latter) to be found in the work 
of structural anthropologists like Mircea Eliade and Claude Lévi-
Strauss.1 However, Soyinka’s explication of the temporality of the 
Yoruba worldview is more properly read as a resistance to, and/or 
rejection of, the implicit narrative of progress and development that 
underpins the modernist (Eurocentric) drive of such anthropological 
projects. What is at stake is the coherence of a world articulated 
through, and structured by, this ordered division of time as it maps out 
the relationship between ways of living and ways of dying.  
Indeed, in his well-known “Author’s Note” to would-be producers 
of the play, Soyinka makes it clear that the purpose of his piece is not 
to present some reductive “clash of cultures,” insisting that the 
“Colonial factor is an incident, a catalytic incident merely.” Rather, the 
“confrontation of the play is largely metaphysical, contained in the 
human vehicle which is Elesin and the universe of the Yoruba mind—
the world of the living, the dead and the unborn, and the numinous 
passage which links all: transition” (145). Soyinka’s point is to reject 
that insistent worldview that sees postcolonial culture as driven by a 
continuing obsession with Europe and a Euro-centric normative 
intellectual history: “It is thanks to this kind of perverse mentality that 
I find it necessary to caution the would-be producer of this play against 
a sadly familiar reductionist tendency, and to direct his vision instead 
to the far more difficult and risky task of eliciting the play’s threnodic 
essence” (“Author’s Note” 144). Such an insistence is clearly readable 
in terms of a postcolonial intellectual history; Soyinka is in effect 
refusing his characters as othered Subjects who serve to reinforce the 
European mind as normative. In his Nobel acceptance speech in 1986, 
for example, he took the opportunity to undertake a brief but powerful 
deconstruction of the position of the African “Subject” in colonial 
discourse (he does this in the context of what he sees as the continuing 
epistemic violence that haunts the reconfiguration of relations within 
the postcolonial). In particular, returning to Hegel, Soyinka locates the 
African as legal (non)Subject at the heart of Europe’s 
philosophical/juridical project: 
 
Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, to cite just my favourite example, found it convenient 
to pretend that the African had not yet developed to the level where he “attained 
that realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, God, or 
Law—in which the interest of man's volition is involved and in which he realizes 
his own being.” (par 24) 
 
Death and the King’s Horseman is in effect a tragedy born of the 
tensions inherent in this “pretence.” This is certainly the case if we 
read tragedy in the manner proposed by Soyinka as “the most insistent 
voice that bids us return to our own sources. There, illusively, hovers 
the key to the human paradox, to man’s experience of being and non-
being, his dubiousness as essence and matter, intimations of transience 
and eternity, and the harrowing drives between uniqueness and 
Oneness” (“Fourth Stage” 140). Death and the King’s Horseman, as 
reinforced by Soyinka’s interpretative strategy, is a tragedy centred on 
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crises of being and non-being, of transience and eternity, played out in 
a space ordered by the Yoruba worldview—as opposed to the Hegelian 
space of existential absence. 
While understanding Soyinka’s desire to see the work as a self-
contained tragedy, it is difficult to sustain completely the position that 
the colonial factor is a mere catalytic incident. The play’s structure is 
quite reliant on the intervention of the colonial officer in the tribal 
traditions surrounding royal death, and many of the piece’s central 
dialogues play out the problematics of communication, unequal power, 
and incommensurate philosophies shaped by different intellectual 
laboratories. The stage-space of Death and the King’s Horseman is 
constantly occupied by a multivalent philosophical nexus, which 
stages two different metaphysical worldviews and, more particularly, 
two different conceptions of the Law and the source of its power over 
the bodies in its purview. The first is the metaphysical “universe of the 
Yoruba mind,” a space in which the Law’s power resides at the level 
of communal transcendental needs. In the ritual of which Elesin is the 
central protagonist, at least as Soyinka seeks to present it, the Law 
appears to reside in the stage of transition—the body on which the Law 
acts is thus seen as part of a continuum rather than as the marker of a 
binary opposition (life/death). The second metaphysics of the Law is 
revealed by Pilkings’s (European) intervention, whose actions rely on 
a series of juridical binaries (civilised/barbaric; modern/primitive; 
European/other). The bodies on which such a version of the Law act 
are constructed in terms of a particular kind of individuality that 
reveals a radically different conception of the source and power of the 
Law. This is not to return the play to the reductive readings rejected by 
Soyinka, but rather to reveal the multivalent metaphysics at its centre. 
In order to do this more fully I want now to explore the ways in which 
Death and the King’s Horseman is haunted by a figure representative 
of a certain kind of European modernity: “bare life.”    
 
 
“Bare Life”: Western Modernity and the Law 
 
Giorgio Agamben’s recent influential work on the nature and function 
of (European) sovereign power—with its specific attention to 
sovereignty as executed through “the Law”—has centred on the 
recovered archaic and paradoxical figure of homo sacer (sacred man), 
a figure Agamben re-presents as “bare life.”2 For Agamben this 
archaic figure (he traces its existence back through classical Greek and 
Roman juridical systems) was one from whom the usual protection of 
both the Law and religion had been removed. Thus: homo sacer could 
be killed and yet not murdered—as defined in Law; homo sacer could 
be killed and yet not sacrificed—as defined by religious codification.3 
Placed outside all modes of protection, then, sacred man is transformed 
into “bare life,” a body stripped down to the point where all that 
remains is its corporeal signification. It is in this passage from 
inclusion to exclusion that Agamben detects the proper significance of 
homo sacer for the performance of the Law and, thus, sovereign 
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power. In this version of the juridico-political order the Law includes 
us all in its purview exactly through its power to exclude us from its 
protection. Slavoj Žižek frames this paradox succinctly by locating 
homo sacer as “that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert 
caretaking knowledge, but is excluded … from all rights” (35). This 
paradox of inclusion/exclusion (our possible exclusion from the Law is 
the very thing that defines our inclusion within its reach) is the 
juridical motor, Agamben argues, at the heart of the development of 
modern biopolitics. This is a development which we can in turn read as 
central to the very nature of modernity—as Agamben reminds us: “It 
can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the 
original activity of sovereign power” (Homo Sacer 6). Sovereign 
power is thus the source of an ideological locus that has the “right” to 
decide when the Law can be suspended—i.e. withdrawn in a manner 
that leaves certain bodies in the position of “bare life.”4 At the heart of 
sovereignty, that most complex of abstractions, then, we find the 
power to define and create bare life, a power revealed as all too 
material in its execution on real bodies.5 
In the course of tracing the development of (European) sovereign 
power and the Law into the twentieth century (which involves tracking 
down and revealing the shadowy figure of homo sacer as an ever-
present juridical concept), Agamben points us to a Franz Kafka short 
story that he reads as revelatory of the invasive reach of disciplining 
power in late modernity (as with much else in Kafka, this nightmare of 
legal totality can only seem evermore prescient to his twenty-first 
century readers). “Before the Law,” a story perhaps better described as 
a parable, tells of a “man from the country” who comes in search of 
admittance to the Law. He comes to an open door—an entrance to the 
Law we are told—but the attendant doorkeeper refuses to let him pass 
to what is beyond: “The man thinks about it and then asks whether in 
that case he will be allowed in later. ‘Possibly’, says the doorkeeper, 
‘but not at the moment’” (194).6 This perpetual deferral—“not yet”—is 
key to the story’s power; its effect is to require the man to sit waiting 
at the door awaiting his admittance. This pattern of request and refusal 
is continued for many years, with the man from the country now 
permanently camped at the threshold to the open door. In fact the man 
spends the rest of his life in just this position, summoning up points of 
clarification to be addressed to the intransient doorkeeper (discussion 
is possible but the final answer is always a refusal to admit the 
desperate man), until he reaches the very final moments of his life:    
 
He has not long to live. Before he dies, everything he has learnt in the entire time 
becomes concentrated in his head into a question that he has not asked the 
doorkeeper hitherto. He beckons him to approach, for his body is growing stiff 
and he can no longer get up. The doorkeeper has to bend right down to him, the 
difference in height between them having altered very much to the man’s 
disadvantage. “What do you want to know now?” the doorkeeper asks. “You’re 
insatiable.” “Everybody seeks the Law,” says the man, “so how is it that in all 
these years no one but me has demanded admittance?” The doorkeeper sees that 
it is all over for the man, and to penetrate his growing deafness he shouts at him, 
“No one else could gain admittance here because this entrance was meant for you 
alone. Now I am going to close it.” (195) 
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The seemingly counter-intuitive denouement on further inspection 
reveals the real power of the Law (within Western modernity). In the 
end it is those moments when we are excluded from the Law’s gaze 
that reveal the extent to which we have been included in its reach all 
along. In the late-modern world of totalising power we cannot enter 
into the Law because we are already and always included in its grip. It 
is for this reason that Kafka’s man from the country cannot be 
‘admitted’ to the Law—as Massimo Cacciari puts it: “We can enter 
only there where we can open. The already-open [il già-aperto] 
immobilizes. The man from the country cannot enter, because entering 
into what is already open is ontologically impossible” (qtd. Homo 
Sacer 49). The man, then, has been in the grasp of the Law all along, 
precisely through his position of waiting for admittance to it. Standing 
at a site of possible exclusion awaiting the enactment of a potential 
juridical power are the very acts of exception that define our 
presence/inclusion (already and always) in the open field of the Law. 
At the heart of this reading of power stands a very particular 
understanding of politicised death.  
Death is no longer the limit of biopolitics (as Foucault at times 
seemed to suggest); it is rather now the very place at which sovereign 
power is specifically exercised. Sovereign power and the Law have 
become concerned with the manner in which certain kinds of death are 
legitimised and allowed to happen (or “made happen”). Death can no 
longer be read as a final refuge from power, in the sense of a place that 
stands beyond its grip, instead it is the realm of power’s most explicit 
execution. Or, to put it another way, while the production of death may 
always have come within power’s purview, its signification and 
performance (as related to the body in politics) has radically altered 
within late modernity. As Agamben puts it, while at times the nature of 
sovereignty may have been described as the power “to make die and to 
let live,” it now often seems to be better framed by the dictum “to 
make live and to let die” (Remnants 82-83). Death stands not as an 
unspeakable gap within the biopolitical order, in other words; rather it 
provides the grammar of signification through which sovereign power 
inscribes its hegemonic modality. Agamben and Kafka, in their 
different ways, each reveal a radically exposed legal individual at the 
heart of European modernity. This is European man before the face of 
power, stripped to the very essentials of singular selfhood. The legal 
Subject in modernity is thus one that stands completely individuated in 
an open field of power. Located in terms of oppositional binaries, and 
stripped from his/her signification within the broad field of communal 
identities, the modern legal Subject under the gaze of sovereign power 
is that which has the potential to be bare life.  
There is little doubt that the production of a legal order that 
produces “bare life” stands at the heart of the colonial project. There is 
a critical difference, however, in the colonial production of 
individuated legal subjects, as read against the performance of this 
process in the imperial centres, in that the colonised other was caught 
in a doubly complex power-matrix. It is not so much that this othered 
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subject could be made “bare life” but rather she/he was already “bare 
life” by the very nature of her/his status as colonial other. Rather than a 
condition of potential, in other words, the othered subject was pre-read 
as beyond the limits of civilised Law in a self-generating discourse of 
inclusion and exclusion. Indeed the colonial project was reliant on the 
production of such excluded bodies—while colonialism’s declared aim 
may have been the inclusion of such bodies within the civis, the 
justification for its continuation relied on the perpetual failure of this 
self-same process. As Peter Fitzpatrick and Eve Darian-Smith put it, 
“European or Western identity is constituted in opposition to an 
alterity that it has itself constructed. Identity is so formed in a defining 
exclusion of certain existent peoples accorded characteristics 
ostensibly opposed to that identity—savages and barbarians” (1). This 
is a process that is crucial to understanding the metaphysical struggles 
that regulate Soyinka’s Death and the King’s Horseman.  
 
 
Before the Law(s): “Bare Life” and Death and the King’s 
Horseman  
 
Keeping Kafka’s figure of European man stripped bare before the door 
of the Law in mind, then, I want to return finally to the ideas of 
passages and gateways that haunt Death and the King’s Horseman. 
Elesin’s ritual destiny is continually explained (by himself and others) 
in terms of a transitional phase—a movement through a passage or 
gateway—and it is in the abstract performance of this metaphysical 
movement that we find the idea of the law as the regulator of 
communal needs and desires. While making his case for taking a new 
bride on the day of his ritual, for example, Elesin repeatedly conjures 
the image of standing at the entrance of a space that escapes binary 
notions of existence:  
 
All you who stand before the spirit that dares 
The opening of the last door of passage, 
Dare to rid my going of regrets! My wish 
Transcends the blotting out of thought 
In one mere moment’s tremor of the senses. 
Do me credit. And do me honour. 
I am girded for the route beyond 
Burdens of waste and longing. 
Then let me travel light. Let 
Seed that will not serve the stomach 
On the way remain behind. Let it take root 
In the earth of my choice, in this earth 
I leave behind. (160) 
 
It is an argument that the Praise-Singer Iyaloja finds unable to resist, 
telling the women of the market: “It is those who stand at the gateway 
of the great change to whose cry we must pay heed” (161-162). 
Crucially, this image of the gateway returns to Elesin in the final 
moments of the play as he tries to explain the effect of Pilkings’s 
intervention in his duty: “You saw it, Iyaloja. You saw me struggle to 
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retrieve my will from the power of the stranger whose shadow fell 
across the doorway and left me floundering and blundering in a maze I 
had never before encountered” (210). In terms generated by 
Agamben’s work, Elesin may here be read as describing the process of 
being made “bare life.” Pilkings’s intervention, in other words, 
removed Elesin from a version of law based on the phases of transition 
(envisaged above by Elesin as the “last door of passage”) and placed 
him before the door of European law. The result is a form of radical 
dislocation or existential crisis—“left me floundering and blundering 
in a maze I had never before encountered”. In the end Elesin’s death 
has been stripped of its proper signification, his is a death that can thus 
only be read in a simple binary with life. The colonial project 
presented as an extension of the civis—seen here functioning in its 
legalistic rendering—in fact produces bodies stripped of any 
protection, left before the door of a law that must necessarily exclude 
them to justify its own existence.  
The figure of “bare life” may thus be located as a constituent 
grammatical element of the epistemic violence involved in what 
Gayatri Spivak sums up as “the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and 
heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other” (76). 
The production of “political bodies” simultaneously embraced by an 
imperial juridical order and yet removed from the position of fully 
protected “subjects” provides a clear link between homo sacer and 
Spivak’s sense that this project involved “the asymmetrical obliteration 
of the trace of the Other in its precarious Subject-ivity” (76). 
Agamben’s work on the “othered” body within (and thus without) the 
juridical order also adds new emphasis to Spivak’s assertion that the 
“constitution of that Other of Europe” was formulated “not only by 
ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the 
Law” (75). The Law thus becomes one more discursive space wherein 
“great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which 
such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary” 
(Spivak 75). In these terms colonialism can be read as the project 
whereby non-European territories were opened up, and thus re-
articulated as “open spaces,” for the performance of an “always-
happening” European juridical order. If the production of the 
biopolitical body stands at the centre of modernity, at the heart of 
colonialism we find the construction of a juridical order that holds 
othered bodies in its grip by leaving them (constantly) exposed to their 
articulation as bare life. The real face of power is thus revealed most 
clearly at those moments when what is at stake is the juncture between 
political life and politicised death; and it is this juncture (spatial and 
temporal) that Soyinka opens up to radical enquiry in Death and the 




     1. See for example, Eliade, “Cosmogonic Myth and ‘Sacred 
History,’” and Myths, Dreams and Mysteries.  
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     2. For an extended discussion of this figure, as well as Homo Sacer, 
see Agamben’s State of Exception. 
 
     3. As Agamben puts it, the proper significance of the home sacer 
figure is that it is “situated at the intersection of a capacity to be killed 
and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine Law” (Homo 
Sacer 73). 
 
     4. There is a particular paradox at work here, one which Agamben 
notes as “the Law is outside itself,” or alternatively as “I, the 
sovereign, who am outside the Law, declare that there is nothing 
outside the Law” (Homo Sacer 15). For a powerful explication of the 
ramifications of this power in the context of post-September 11th 
geopolitics, see Judith Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence—particularly the essay “Indefinite Detention.” 
 
     5. In this respect Agamben’s work sheds new light on Carl 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty: “Sovereign is he who decides on 
the state of exception.” For more on this relationship see Homo Sacer 
8-19 passim, and Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology: Four Chapters on 
the Concept of Sovereignty.  
 
     6. Franz Kafka, “At the door of the Law,” as found in Franz Kafka: 
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